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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, bloody wars that arose as a result of separation in 
Yugoslavia (among the Christian Serbs and the Muslim Bosnians), the 2001 terrorist attacks to the 
World Trade Center in New York and finally the victory of Islam-based movements to achieve power in 
Islamic countries (such as the Welfare party in Turkey, Islamic Saving Association in Aljazeer) resulted 
in concerns about the possibility of a second cold war by the Western people. In this new cold war, the 
opposing parties are not communism and liberalism but rather it is the Armageddon among the 
political Islam (as a divine school) and Western secularism ideology (as human school). In this war, 
the recent thought has its root in the open mind age of philosophical, cultural and scientific history of 
the West and more than 200 years of modernism where most of the thinking, belief, epistemology and 
ontology of west are formed on this basis. Meanwhile any political activity of Islamic countries at the 
international level that is on the opposition of secular principles of Western countries is regarded as 
Islamic fundamentalism in the West camp and the movement of the political Islam is regarded as a 
subsidiary and unprecedented issue in the study of the policies of the Islamic countries. The important 
point is that there is a basic difference among political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism and in this 
way the method and approach of Islamism should be noted in order to obtain Islamic rules and 
regulations at national and international level. Some western thinkers do not recognized any difference 
among these two movements and regard them as identical. Therefore, the governments in Western 
countries approach the region in the same manner. It is to be noted that when the issue of political 
Islam is raised, this aspect of Islam is neither integrated nor concentrated as its religious aspect and 
we are faced with a vast range in which there is liberal Islam oriented and democrat people on one 
hand and fundamentalists, on the other hand. In order to apply Islamic rules and regulations by 
authorities, they do not neglect any action even if it may be on the opposition of Islamic rules and 
regulations. A question is raised here as to which between the Moderation and Radicalism approaches 
are more successful in obtaining sovereignty of Islam at the national level and finally in defending 
Islam at the international level and whether they have achieved the aforesaid goals. The present article 
intends to find answers to the aforesaid question with respect to the epistemological and historical 
point of view and analyze the activities and the effects of Lebanon Hezbollah on domestic policy of 
Lebanon and available regional policy in the Middle East. 
 






If we regard the Westphalia treaties (Osnabrück and Münster) concluded in order to end 
the 30 years of religious wars among the Saint German Rome emperorship and the King of 
France as the starting point of international relations, then it should also be recognized that 
this marked the end of religion in the field of international policy. In other words, the starting 
point of international relations is the end point of religion in the field of international policy. 
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This process is completed followed by important events such as the Industrial Revolution, 
the start of the period of Enlightenment, victory of the French Revolution. These events 
prepared the grounds for separating existing religion from international policy and domestic 
field of western countries. In this regard, some have defined the Westphalia treaties as the 
symbol of renaissance in the field of international relations. After the conclusion of the 
aforesaid treaties, the European people observed unique achievements in the field of political 
affairs, such as the formation of government and nation based on four elements (government, 
sovereignty, population and land) and changes in the components of government legitimacy 
from the traditional ones based on religion and royal dynasties to the public will which was 
determined by the level of public satisfaction about the society (Halliday 2001: 359-373). 
Historically, throughout the age of Rome emperorship and that of the Medieval times, there 
were a series of paradigm changes in how a government should be formed. As time passed, 
the European people began to regard the modern framework of forming political societies 
and establishing the governing system based on the aforesaid modern indices as better than 
other frameworks. Consequently, they attempted to popularize it and transfer it to other 
societies as well. Upon the emergence of the Industrial revolution in Europe, the victory of 
the French Revolution and modernism in the political, social, cultural and economic fields, 
the issue of religion in the West came to be gradually neglected. Rather, a newer issue such 
as the infrastructure of the modern government came to be recognized as an important 
development in the field of international policy. Following globalization of international 
relations in the final quarter of the 19th century and the development of European foreign 
policy based on colonialism, the initial attempts to plant the newly developing modern 
government paradigm to countries outside the European continent including Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa were made. Different geographical regions reacted differently in 
response to the modern government paradigm. For example, in Latin America, the new 
framework was promptly adopted in the process of creating new nation-states and achieving 
independence. However, in the Middle East, in spite of the long existing backgrounds of 
civilization and culture, the process of creating the nation-state was substantially delayed. 
The people of the region could not easily adapt to the process and opposed and resisted the 
new framework. Events such as the outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in the first decade of 20th century resulted in vast changes in the Islamic 
land of the Middle East region and prepared grounds for the advance of the Western colonial 
governments (England and France). The nation-states in this region were only established 
when international organizations such as the United Nations exercised its mandate under 
which the two governments officially implemented their previous agreements (Sykes and 
Picot Agreement) that divided the lands. It is not an exaggeration to describe government 
reform in the Middle East region as a challenge, since more than a century has passed since 
the initial attempt. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, the region experienced a 
change of environment, especially in the eyes of the West, with the emergence of radical 
Islamic movements. This paper recognizes and takes notice of these movements in the 
following analysis of the power and influence of political Islam in the Middle East. By virtue 
of the activities of the political Islam in the Middle East, four main movements in this region 
have been created. In this way, it is necessary to mention that the main reason behind the 
emergence of political Islam is the changing beliefs and patterns of the religious identity of 
people in the Middle East region, which were influenced by their exchanges with the modern 
Western beliefs and culture. This exchange may be divided into four time periods as follows.   
 




1) The first movement of political Islam was formed by prominent thinkers including 
Sayyid Jamal-ad-Din Asadabadi and Muhammad Abduh. This began with the advance of the 
Western people to the Muslim countries when England intervened in the government system 
of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.  This continued onwards to 1914 when England 
took over Egypt. In addition to reviving Islam and emphasizing Islamic values for people in 
the Middle East, this group of thinkers focused on remembering the past glorious periods of 
the Islamic nation. In fact, the activism of Islamism during this period was a reaction and a 
response to the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East region (Simbar 2009: 120). They 
sought to prevent the presence and activity of the Western countries in Islamic systems from 
growing by developing non-religious governments to oppose the autocracy and attempted to 
discredit their integrity, from the view point of Islam. 
 
2) Some theoreticians consider the 1967 “Six Day War” between Arab and Israel which 
resulted in the defeat of Arab and the support of the Western countries as the principal factor 
that triggered the second movement of the political Islam. At the time, the prevailing 
government system in Arab countries was mainly based on imported ideology such as 
socialism and secularism. In spite of having gone through six crises (legitimacy, identity, 
distribution, influence, integration and partnership) and economic problems, to change the 
public perception, they encouraged their military forces to fight against Israel in the process 
of leading the Pan Arabic movement in Arab lands. Finally, as a result of the aforesaid 
problems and the indisputable support of Western countries for Israel, the Arabic army 
consisting of Egypt, Syria, Jordon and Iraq were quickly defeated. The problems in Arab 
countries, the inability of the system to resolve these problems, and the defeat of Arab people 
in the war against Israel which had the backing of the Western countries, led to a feeling of 
frustration in the region’s people. Against this backdrop, the Islamic movement was created 
in these countries and the slogan such as ‘Islam is the Solution of Problems’ was popularized 
in region (Esposito 2000: 50). 
 
3) Most of the Western writers and thinkers that had dealt with the issue of political Islam 
have argued that the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a turning point in the creation of Islam 
orientation in the Middle East. In this way, the Islamic political system replaced and was 
favored over secular government types of the West. It also came to dominate the rules and 
regulations in a country that was already regarded as the center of gravity for the Western 
block. Thus, the movement of Islam was formed in the Middle East region. The Iranian 
Revolution that challenged hegemony of the West and the East harked back to days of 
grandeur of the Islamic civilization and creation of Islamic identity among people in this 
region. The Revolution also exerted national and regional influence in developing political 
Islam in the Middle East region and this continues to this day (Teti 2008: 218). 
 
4) The last and the most powerful movement of political Islam in the Middle East region 
goes back to the end of the Cold war and the final decade of the 20th century. It was 
accompanied with events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the gap of power at the 
international system level, openness towards other ideologies including Western liberal 
democracy within the framework of globalization at the international level. In this way, 
Western theoreticians including Samuel Huntington with his theory of the Clash of 
Civilization, Francis Fukuyama who wrote The End of History and The Last Man, and 
Benjamin Barber who authored Jihad vs. McWorld (Murden 2001: 539-552) divided the 
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world into two opposition camps of the Islam and the West. Furthermore, they prepared 
grounds for creation of terrorist movements such as Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda  and Jama’at al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad affiliated to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  
 
In the current Middle East, in addition to the Islamic Republic of Iran government, other 
powerful regional and national movements such as the Development and Justice party in 
Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in 
Palestine form a vast range of political Islam. As time passed and the Islamic movements 
expanded, this issue worked against the benefits of Western countries in the Middle East 
region. In line with these changing circumstances, nowadays, academic centers in Western 
countries pay considerable attention to the increased recognition of the political Islam as a 
modern challenge to the West world that emerged after the end of the Cold war. According 
to most Western experts in the field of Middle East affairs such as Bernard Lewis who 
belongs to the first generation of regional experts, Michael C. Hudson, Daniel Pipes, Richard 
V. Allen, Steven L. Spiegel, Anthony Cordesman, Philip Robins, John Esposito, Malcolm H. 
Kerr, James p. Piscatori, Graham Fuller, Fred Halliday, and Eastern experts such as Albert 
Hourani, Majid Khadduri from first generation and Hisham Sharabi, Rashid Khalidi, Richard 
Hrair Dekmejian, Bassam Tibi, Fawaz Gerges, and David Menashri are regarded as more or 
less fundamentalists in the field of political Islam. According to these groups of experts, any 
attempt for establishing government system that does not conform to the Western patterns 
that leads to struggles may be affiliated to fundamentalism. The definition of political Islam 
that is accepted by most of the Western thinkers is an attempt to dominate the basics of legal 
laws, ethical norms and religious values in government system with the goal of achieving 
spiritual salvation. According to the aforesaid definition, if we regard insisting Islamism on 
executing Islamic rules and regulations in political structure system as criteria for affiliating 
them to fundamentalism, then the Western thinking relation to establishing political system 
based on components of modern world (government, nation, secularism, people oriented, 
basics of legitimacy of government) in other governments may also be considered as 
fundamentalism. Meanwhile, attention to the epistemology of Western opinion with respect 
to political Islam and the same understanding of political Islam, in spite of the growing 
movement to find out the negative aspects of Western countries toward activity of political 
Islam has great importance. According to opinion of the Western thinkers, since political 
Islam an attempt to change secular discourse that dominates the international system, it has 
always been studied in a negative light. While political Islam as a divine religion has a 
pluralistic nature (Ehteshami 1997: 179-199) and thus, limiting it within a framework of 
conceptual fundamentalism is not a fair assessment. This can also backlash and result in 
increasing range of violence related to radical groups of Islamic nations against imported 
patterns of government structure of Western countries. Nowadays political Islam covers a 
vast range of Islamic activities in which there is Al Qaeda Islamism on the one hand that 
avoids the components of the West’s modern world with their own understandings of Islam 
and Imam Musa Al-Sadr on the other, which vindicates Shiite population of Lebanon within 
framework of national and secular government. In this way, Lebanon’s Hezbollah is a merge 
of the Western modern government system, nationalism, and search for its nature through 
framework of political national system of Lebanon. In addition to accepting secular system 
of Lebanon and activity in political national system of this country, Islamic identity is 
regarded as an active component of the Middle East region. As a result, during the past 20 
years, it has changed the system of this region. Maybe it is possible to say that emergence 




and activity of Hezbollah within framework of domestic rules and Lebanon confirms the 
view point of western countries in relation to political Islam, since studying activity of 
Hezbollah in historical series of Lebanon show this movement merging positive components 
of Western countries and reformism method of political Islam at the regional and the 
international system. According to the aforesaid issues, in addition to two components such 
as political Islam with respect to Western epistemology and Hezbollah with respect to 
studying historical series of its formation in political society of Lebanon based on social 
movement theory (SMT), and the change of this movement from radicalism to moderation 
and its entrance to political system of Lebanon, we intend to test to following hypothesis: 
Political Islam as a promoting movement intends to adopt the positive aspects of modern 
achievements of Western countries and fundamentalism, and violence is a method applied 
only by a few number of Islam oriented groups. However, the aforesaid elements are not 
regarded as components and nature of political Islam movement. The present article analyzes 
this issue in three chapters. First, the relationship of Islam and the international system from 
epistemological point of view of Western countries is studied. Then being aware of the 
incorrect understanding of Western people, the difference between political Islam and 
Islamic fundamentalist, and the political activity of Lebanon Hezbollah is studied as a social 
movement and reformism of political Islam movement at the international level. 
 
 
2. POLITICAL ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
The term political Islam was first raised in 1970 like the term nationalism in spite of 
having had a long background of more than 1400 years. It entered the international relations 
literature of with great delay. Of course it is to be noted that since the field of international 
relations is regarded as a relatively recent academic field and it has been less than 100 years 
since this field has been established at university centers, active Western theoreticians tend to 
neglect looking at the background of the activity of Islamism at the international level and 
only pay attention to the Islam seeking movements during the recent century (i.e. since the 
creation of nation-state in the Middle East region). Therefore, in spite of more than 14 
centuries that Islamism has been active in the field of international policy, this term 
nevertheless, entered the international relations literature only upon the victory of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. In any case, according to Denoeux’s definition, the term political Islam 
means the movements and ideologies affiliated to Islamic sources, statements, organizations 
and events originated from Islamic traditions that act based on detailed and comprehensive 
political instructions (Denoeux 2002: 61). Ayubi regards political Islam as an issue dealing 
with theories or movements. He claims that Islam has political and governmental theory 
(Ayubi 1992: 60-78). Hefner believes that political Islam seeks to revive piety and general 
religious activities that was prevalent during 1970s and 1980s in Islam world. However, he 
insists that there exists a diverse set of commitments within this movement and that there are 
differences among general aspect of Muslim’s piety, identity and political Islam (Hefner 
2005: 18). Salvatore has referred to political Islam as a conceptual and symbolic structure 
that is cannot be described in a simple manner since it is not a clear phenomenon (Salvatore 
1999: xxvi). He believes that looking at only the political aspect of Islam results in rejection 
of the religion from related norms and rejection of Islamic government from initial concepts 
of political sciences (Salvatore 1999: xx). According to the aforesaid opinions, it seems that 
view points of Hefner and Salvatore are important with respect to several aspects: 
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1) Maintaining diversity for commitment of Islamic movements  
2) Originating political Islam from ordinary Islam and extending field of political Islam  
 
The attempt to understand the traditions of Muslims regardless of their insistence for 
accompanying religion and politics, the two elements in which modern society intends to 
separate, with respect to practical and conceptual aspect, is doomed to failure. As Mitchell 
argues, in his book Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, social sciences is 
based on obvious experiences of the Western world’s history and is regarded as a standard 
framework for global knowledge (Mitchell 2002: 7). In this way, the view points of the 
political Islam in the field of international relations are formed based on secular 
epistemology.  
On this basis, the framework for secular concepts specifies questions which are asked in 
relation to separation of religion, politics, religion and political religion (Asad 1996: 11). 
According to Hirschkind, a comprehensive recognition of political Islam should be based on 
Western concepts such as religion, politics and secularism since it indicates historical 
extension of statements. In addition, they may not be used as a set of global issues or new 
issues (Hirschkind 1997: 14). Most of the attempts to offer theory in the field of international 
relations intend to find relationship among religious patterns, actors and organizations inside 
sovereignty, security, global government, solution of disputes, human rights, dialogue among 
civilizations and role of main actors. According to this, all of the desired hypotheses in 
relation to recognizing political Islam are all secular. So nowadays, traditions, attitudes and 
secular habits are regarded as part of cultural basics and norms of international relations in 
the contemporary world and are inseparable part of traditional epistemology of research. 
Consequently, the traditional approaches of international relations guarantee special type of 
religious topics that has its roots in center of power for secularism (Lynch 2000: 758). 
Secular epistemology has created special conditions because in today’s human life, the 
general, the private, the religious, the political, the mundane and the spiritual are all separate 
fields. Such approaches have resulted in a special understanding of the political Islam and 
reviving religion. They have also yielded important political results in international relations. 
Political Islam is regarded as secondary phenomena by secular analysts. They look to 
political Islam as a divergent and aggressive movement for public space, and so that 
retrospect to pre-modern methods, it is regarded as political discipline for Muslims. In sum, 
recognizing Islam and its policies are possible by using specified secular frameworks. This 
results in creation of religious and cultural backgrounds which help the Western people can 
understand political Islam. Shakman Hurd has regarded two classes of secular hypothesis to 
form cultural background as follows (Shakman Hurd 2008: 118).  
 
1) In laicism, the political Islam is regarded as a front for political and economic benefits 
and illogical violation of religious approaches from general secular lifestyle of the majority 
of the people. This threatens the general democratic discipline and is an indicator of 
movement of society toward divine government. 
 
2) In Jewish- Christian secular belief, the phenomena of political Islam is regarded as 
nonstandard mixture of Islam and politics and it seems that there is fundamental difference 
among modern point of view (Christians or Judeo-Christian) in relation to separation of 
church from government.  
 




Research on the status of Muslim societies shows that separation of political power and 
religious power is not only available at most of the societies with respect to historical point 
of view, but also due to the unique components in Islam, it cannot be maintained. Each of the 
two aforesaid hypotheses generally deals with this issue that political Islam is regarded as a 
refusal to accept and confirm the superiority of domain of the private field and violation of 
public and private fields of seculars (McAlister 2001: 220). As Connolly has argued, the 
reason for identifying such behavior with political Islam is that in this point of view, the 
impartial conditions are not maintained for analyzing topics and concepts through hegemony 
of Western secular methods (Connolly 1999: 22). At the present time, Western secular 
epistemology creates public understanding of political Islam. So, this insight about the 
obstacles for understanding this issue results in creation of mentality that few people deals 
with nature of political Islam (Euben 1999: xiv). In fact, this point of view that originates 
from secularism hypothesis which has its roots in history and experience of the Western 
countries. This is the basis of the public understanding of political Islam. In other words, 
secular epistemology and its power pays a particular attention to the special mode of 
religious topics and special understanding of common policies. It appears like so, from this 
point of view to Muslim societies. Based on this, the secular point of view deals with the 
entrance of religion into the field of politics, against fundamentalism and bigotry. Until now 
the relationship of the political Islam and the West has not studied from this point of view. 
For example, William Raymond Baker, in his book Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New 
Islamists, has referred to the preference of the West for political framework in the negative 
aspect while looking at modern Islam oriented movements in Egypt. He explains that this 
negativism is an obvious mistake of the West which may not be accepted by researchers 
(Baker 2003: 4). Fawaz Georges has mentioned that cultural values of Western countries 
play a key role in the formation of understanding politicians from Islamism (Georges 1999: 
20). Based on this, the following two important issues shall be given attention to.  
 
1) Secularism approaches of western countries enjoy a special status in the formation of 
recognized cultural differences and cultural values that have not already been noted by Baker 
and Georges (as theoreticians who deal with thinking and philosophical differences). 
Although finding a causality among them is a complicated task, the epistemology of the 
secularists results in indescribable cultural impediments. 
 
2) Evaluation of secularists from the viewpoint of the political Islam has important 
political results in the field of international relations. Among the results, the most important 
result we may refer to is the retrogressive point of view of political Islam approaches in the 
analysis of secularism, which the Western countries believe that Islamic movements are 
about to be merged with fundamentalism.  
 
According to the aforesaid issues, it seems that the negative perception of the Western 
countries towards the activity of political Islam and basics and principles of this movement 
originates from their epistemology of political Islam. By neglecting the fundamental 
differences between the phenomena of Islam as a divine school and its empirical 
achievement which forms the basics of the ideology, they attempt to dictate their frameworks 
to other societies. Thus, the reason that the Western people equate political Islam with 
fundamentalism is a result of determination, lack of sufficient recognition for behaving with 
this phenomenon. 
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3. POLITICAL ISLAM & ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
Islamic fundamentalism is a term that most of western thinkers apply it to call the 
movement of political Islam. In sum, this title, in addition to other titles such as Islamic 
awareness and Islamic reviving, is a term that is used by experts in the field of Islamic 
movements. However, the title of political Islam or Islam orientation is more preferred by the 
Islamic thinkers in describing contemporary Islamic movements. As it was already 
mentioned, the political Islam is a new term that belongs to the modern world. Before the 
emergence of the concept of sovereignty of Western modernism and secularism teachings in 
world, this term was not applicable. When the West entered the Middle East region in the 
first 20th century and attempted to suggest their political, social, economic and cultural 
system, a movement of political Islam was raised against Western modernism teachings in 
which the Western people in order to emphasize its abnormality, dubbed this movement as 
fundamentalism or Islamic radicalism. Application of the term political Islam is a result of 
such attempt. Of course there are differences among fundamentalism and political Islam. The 
term fundamentalism has a completely different nuance in the Western culture. However, the 
term political Islam has no negative meaning and is partially neutral. It should be noted that 
how the term such as Islam oriented and political Islam first came to be used is not clear. 
Fundamentalism is an ambiguous term. This term originates from the West’s Christian world. 
It was first used by the American protestants in the 1920s when they published pamphlets 
with the title of “Fundamental” on an optional basis. They first used this term upon accepting 
the absolute correctness of text of the sacred book against the new interpretations in 
Christianity in opposition, to the principles of modernism and return to the Christian 
principles with respect to the Western point of view which is regarded as strict and based on 
bigotry (Heywood 2007: 292-317).  
Although the term fundamentalism first originated in the context of the American 
protestants, Western thinkers of contemporary Islam oriented movements used this term 
without regard for such context. By applying the term fundamentalism to describe all 
contemporary Islamic movements, this came to be understood as a type of Islam oriented 
movement against Western fundamentalism. In this way, with respect to the Western point of 
view, any movement that deals with return of religion to political fields may be regarded as 
fundamentalism. This understanding of political Islam is common in west. The approaches of 
the Western countries have a linear way of viewing the Islam oriented movement and regards 
all Islamic movements as fundamentalism. This is not correct. Simon Murden, in a book 
called The Globalization of World Politic: An Introduction to International Relations, has 
referred to this point, that Islamism has different points of view, that it is possible to classify 
them in several groups and that there are classes with respect to methods of achieving to 
political discipline. For example, some Islamism has a reform-based approach, while Islamic 
fundamentalism has a revolutionary nature and adopts Machiavellistic method in their 
approach towards the current situation. In other words, Islam as a tool is in the hand of the 
fundamentalists. Also, through this, Islamism, their method and behavior is specified. In fact, 
fundamentalists have unique characteristics and thus it is possible to distinguish them from 
Islamism. The differences between these two approaches are described as follows.1 
                                                          
1 Authors believe that there are essential differences between political Islam and the fundamentalist one. 
Therefore, the Western thinkers’ tendency to equate the two may be due to their incorrect 





3.1. Type of Behavior & Political Behavior 
 
In Islamism, the element of Islam is regarded as the main component of belief and faith 
for the people of the society and intersection point of politics and society. Meanwhile, 
fundamentalists, in spite of having resorted to religious ceremonies, are not bound by ethical 
element of religion. They are not afraid of taking any type of action in order to achieve their 
goal. Islamism in its quest toward perfection is bounded by its principles and basics. 
However, fundamentalists look to problems in accordance with the Machiavellian view and 
take any action in order to achieve their goals. It is to be noted that Islamism has a 
reformistic point of view to the world and attempts to remove unsuitable and negative 
problems from world. However, fundamentalists attempt to seize the world in favor of their 
benefits through grave and violent behavior and seek to organize their own desired world. 
Islamism discourages sacrificing values in order to attain their goals and borrowing political 
plot from non-Islamic resources, to achieve a power called Islam. 
 
3.2. Facing with Modernism Phenomena 
 
One of the basic differences between fundamentalism and Islamism is their behavior vis-
a-vis modernism phenomena and its consequences. In this regard, Islamism considers the 
following Western concepts including democracy, human rights, pluralism and economic 
freedom as positive. Fundamentalists, fully aware that adopting Western countries’ signs is 
regarded as index for specifying their political identity, reject them and instead turned to 
anti-modernism approach (Fuller 2004: 11). In other words Islamism is not bifurcated into 
two separate fields of religion and world. In addition to disapproving the negative aspects of 
modernism, they also look at the positive achievements. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, 
do not accept the positive results of modernism and instead condemn it. The most prominent 
index of fundamentalism may be that it refuses to look at the modern West in which 
modernistic fundamentalism movement is equivalent to corruption and collapse. There is a 
belief that secularity is based on atheism and real and true life can only be achieved when 
one returns to traditions of old golden age. 
 
3.3. Understanding Islam 
 
Distinguishing and understanding fundamentalists from Islam is accompanied with 
lowering its status to an ideology. By collecting several components, absolute political and 
social understanding of religion simplifies Islam and their influence in society in order to 
obtain their goals. In other words Islamic fundamentalism does not require all aspects of 
Islam. Rather it looks to Islam for a combat weapon. In this way, some thinkers have viewed 
this understanding of Islam as changing verses of the Koran to ideology within the 
framework of political reactions. In contrast, Islamism demands religion. Islamic society is 
pluralistic where there are no frozen patterns or limits to the religion. This society is a 
criterion for superiority of pious people and it shall be found inside society rather than 
                                                          
understandings about the Islamic beliefs. This paper tries to not only open up a new gate to the 
international relations literature by clarifying political Islamists and the fundamentalist ones, but also 
intends to show the differences between them. 
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outside the society. Therefore, Islamism acts very conservatively in the society and observes 
the acquittance principle.  
 
3.4. Type of Political Structure & System 
 
If Islamism is capable of establishing political structure within their society, their system 
may be regarded as a Political Institution. Political institutions are made of human and may 
change and complete in accordance with their needs. Islamic political institution in 
accordance with religious norms and values, in addition to solving basic human needs, 
organize their behaviors based on religious patterns and create discipline to regulate the 
activities of the people. Political institutions, by creating a partially fixed structure for the 
exchange of humans, decrease uncertainty in life. They also specify domain for selection of 
people and imposes limits to the people of the society. It is then possible to conclude that 
political institutions create limitations which results in organizing relations and behaviors of 
people at Islamic society. Its most important characteristic is stability. In contrast, Islamic 
fundamentalism, due to nature of its fixed thinking has not changed into an institution. 
Rather it continues its existence through the framework of Political Movement. Political 
movement consists of people with common benefits that cooperate to achieve same goal. 
Generally these movements are created out of their official institutions and have no 
concentrated effort for creating discipline.  
The behavior of fundamentalism movements due to lack of a central core for disciplining 
behavior methods does not have enough stability and sometimes it is observed that it does 
not have required durability for effectiveness and achieving goals. 
 
3.5. How to Behave with Logicality Phenomena 
 
Another distinct indice among Islamism and Islamic fundamentalists is the attention to 
wisdom phenomena including the superior element of human life. Islamism in addition to 
mixing logicality with religious basics have reconciled among these two important issues. 
Some of great Shiite jurisprudents in the contemporary age (like Akhound Khorasani) 
believe that religion and law complement each other. So each point that is raised by religion 
is certainly logical and any order that is authorized by wisdom is regarded as religious issue. 
In this way, fundamentalist disrespect wisdom and regard it as fallible. The way to achieve 
success depends on following the scripture without any philosophical and logical 
understanding in which in some cases it may accompany with tradition and lead people 
toward good fortune. By studying the movements of political Islam we can conclude that, 
contrary to the assumption of the Western people that political Islam is the same as Islamic 
fundamentalism, patterns of political Islam with no fundamentalistic characteristics are 
active in the Middle East region. However, they are mistakenly called fundamentalism. One 
of the groups of political Islam is movement of Lebanon Hezbollah. 
 
 
4. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY & ISLAMIC ACTIVISM 
 
Social Movement Theory (SMT) analyzes different movements through 3 elements as 
Political Opportunity, Resource Mobilization and Forming Process (McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald 1996: 1-20). The first generation of social movement theory studies Islamic movements 




were based on social psychology theory (Wiktorowicz 2004: 6). However, later on, these 
movements were analyzed within framework of resource mobilization. Both of the study 
methods analyze Islamic movements. However, the first generation of theories was not able 
to offer neither any response nor reason for Islamic activism. The first generation of social 
movement theory created relationship among the increasing problem in society and 
formation of social mobilization in order to explain Islamic movements. The social 
psychology school has offered two reasons for Islamic activism. 
 
1) First, it is assumed that social movements originate from structural tension. Meanwhile 
the main motivation for Islamic activism under influence of structural crisis is the failure of 
secular renovation projects (Ibid).  
2) The second factor was cultural imperialism that was created as a result of opposition to 
Western culture and Islam, in the colonized regions (Wiktorowicz 2004: 7). 
 
Meanwhile, prompt social-economic changes in the way that wealth was accumulated 
among Western genius people, the status of capitalism and people with corrupt positions has 
negatively affected the minds of the people. Unfavorable economic status deprived the 
majority of the people of political power. This is mixed together with the monopoly of a 
small group of intelligent people who support the alien value system. Finding reasons of 
Islamic activism in the social psychology based on tensions within the society and available 
dissatisfaction was not enough. The primitive method of social psychology theory in social 
movement studies has received several criticisms. Communication among structural tension 
and social involvement were equally raised for similar approaches in the field of Islamic 
activism. The available contradiction or failure in social psychology theory is that social 
movements logically are not related to social tensions. In other words, analyses that show a 
causal relationship among expression of complaints in the society and the creation of social 
movement to express dissatisfaction are losing support. Such theories need to beef up their 
inference by using from resource mobilization theory. Resource mobilization theory argues 
that movements as logical and an indicator of organizing group activity. Resource 
mobilization theory removes all deficiencies of social psychology theory through analysis 
and covers resources and mobilizing structures. The social psychology theory pays attention 
to role of Social Movement Organization (SMO) instead of collecting personal complains. 
For example, Lebanon Hezbollah as a social movement of mosques and social services, plays 
the role of SMO in relation to transferring message. Islamic non-governmental organizations 
form another set of vast organizations. Islamic non-governmental organizations range from 
medical clinics, to hospitals, to charity associations, to schools and to cultural centers. They 
supply necessary goods and basic services. They seek to confirm that Islam is required 
solution for daily problems of Muslim societies. In other words, within a weak central 
government, the Islamic movement enters the stage and by supplying aforesaid services, 
builds a friendly image in the public space (Wiktorowicz 2004: 11). This is how the Islamic 
message becomes popular. This is also how the sectarianism policy remains unchanged. 
Social movements based on social services strategy show that a stable Islam may be a viable 
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5. STRUCTURE & DIVIDING POWER IN LEBANON 
 
Lebanon like other countries of the Middle East region suffers from nation-state crisis. 
Lebanon like other countries of the Middle East region has several thousand years 
civilization which goes back to Phoenician civilization in the Mediterranean region. Since 
800 B.C, when the Phoenician people lived in it, and until its independence experienced 12 
different periods of power transfer. Carl L. Brown, a prominent researcher in the field of 
Middle East affairs, has argued that this region is the most penetrable in the world (Brown 
1984: 75). Lebanon, after many historical struggles and support from France in its 
establishment of a Christian country in the Middle East region, was separated from Syria in 
1920. Under France’s mandate, the nation-state building process began. The first constitution 
was written in accordance with third republic of France in 1926. This constitution, due to 
obvious partiality from Maroni Christians, and the lack of regard for political and national 
rights of other groups in Lebanon, was revised in six phases. At the present time, the 
constitution distributes power based on sect and religious divisions. Power is distributed 
hierarchically, among Maroni Christians (president), Sunni Muslims (prime minister) and 
Shiite Muslims (head of parliament). In addition to these groups, there are other groups and 
sects such as Druze, Ismaili, Jewish, and Alawi (Nusayris or Ansaris) which are active only 
in the parliament due to their smaller sizes. 
 
 
6. EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN LEBANON 
 
Special conditions of power in Lebanon include sectarian structure of power, no one 
dominant group all through the country, religious pluralism, and having Israel as a neighbor. 
These have created special conditions which result in formation of modern and unique 
pattern of political Islam in this country. During formation of Lebanon, the first census was 
held in order to allocate coupon for offering subsidy goods. The Shiite population was 
announced to be the third largest after the Maroni Christians and the Sunni Muslims. On the 
other hand, the Shiite of this country believe that France in the way of achieving its goals 
concerning to establish Christian government in the Middle East region Maroni Christians 
made secret agreements with Arab. Sunni countries have singled this country out, in spite of 
the fact it had more population in that time (1932) in comparison to Christians and Sunni. By 
creating false statistics and manipulating the census, they came to hold the lowest status in 
structure of political power in Lebanon (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: xii). Discrimination of the 
Shiites in Lebanon, negligence of citizen’s rights and their demands, the presence of Imam 
Musa Al-Sadr, and the solidarity achieved by the Shiite has resulted in the creation of 
political Islam in Lebanon. In spite of higher power of Muslims in political structure of 
Lebanon, the Shiite population created the special approach of political Islam in Lebanon. 
The political Islam movement in Lebanon goes back to more than half a century. As Imam 
Musa Al-Sadr entered, and the Islamic revolution in Iran succeeded, and Hezbollah was 
established, it is possible to divide this movement into two periods where it had its highs and 
lows. 
The first wave of political Islam in Lebanon started with Imam Musa Al-Sadr. An Iranian 
Lebanese, he came to Lebanon as a jurisprudent. When he learned about the discrimination 
that the Shiite population faced, he sought to establish Shiite society in this country, by 


















Figure 1. Effective components in formation of first wave of political Islam in Lebanon 
based on modern social movement theory 
 
 
removing the structural poverty among Shiites and vindicating their rights to the central 
government. (Norton 2007: 18). Referring to Koran verses, Imam Musa announced that his 
goal was to eliminate poverty and deprivation from Lebanon. In order to achieve this goal, he 
intended to establish new political, economic, and educational institutes. Against this 
backdrop, the Lebanon Supreme Islamic Shi‘ite Council (SISC) was first established. This 
may be regarded as his first step for entering politics Lebanon. Imam Musa Al-Sadr used 
religion to form a social movement. Through a political opportunity that was granted to him 
on behalf of the Shiite Supreme Parliament, he used his power and influence and established 
institutes such as occupational institutes that allowed him to mobilize resources. Linking 
these three institutes with Amal (military branch of Imam Musa Al-Sadr movement) finally 
resulted in the changing political philosophy for points of view related to secularism (for 
government), liberalism, and political Islam (Norton 2007: 15). 
It is to be noted that although unstable political atmosphere of Lebanon was leading to 
more violence against the existing political system, Imam Musa Al-Sadr preferred that Amal 
and Lebanon Supreme Islamic Shi‘ite Council act within framework of political system of 
Lebanon. In spite of his attempts to obtain more power, he never supported a complete 
collapse and establishment of a new Islamic government. As it was mentioned in his 
declaration at the Lebanon Supreme Islamic Shi‘ite Council in 1977, Imam Musa Al-Sadr 
sincerely believed in keeping diversity of several sects in government of Lebanon (Deeb 
1998: 684). In addition, the Amal statute has referred to this point that Lebanon originates 
from a patriotic atmosphere. In 1978, Imam Musa Al-Sadr while traveling to Libya was 
secretly killed. It seems that his death was related with his role in organizing the Shiite 
population in Lebanon. His mystery death (this may have been executed by the Libya 
government on behalf of those in power in the political field of Lebanon) coincided with the 
absence of Imam Mahdi (Twelfth Imam of Shiites). The permanent loss of Imam Musa Al-
Sadr resulted in the eternal Shiite activism in Lebanon. The pattern of modern political Islam 
headed by Imam Musa Al-Sadr during that period was obviously in contrast with primitive 
waves of political Islam in the Middle East region. The new approach of political Islam 
affiliated to Al-Sadr had reform oriented point of view that accommodated the phenomena of 
National Political System of 
Lebanon 
























Figure 2. Effective components in formation of second wave of political Islam in Lebanon 
based on theory of modern social movement 
 
 
modernism in the West and welcomed its positive achievements. He established new indices 
of political Islam in the Middle East region. He established components such as civil 
associations, activity in the field of national political system, acceptance of the notion of 
sovereignty of the secular system, attention to civil rights and citizenship rights in all sects 
and religious groups and finally, resistance against Israel. This was followed in the next 
decades by modern Islamism in the Middle East region. Imam Musa, in addition to engaging 
in civil activity and working with other groups and the religious sects in the military branch 
of Lebanon called Amal, sought to resist against Israel. Imam Musa Al-Sadr established the 
Amal military group to resist against Israel. This shows that his political approach is a 
mixture of diverse behavioral modes (cooperation, complain, demonstration and war). He 
believed that this method may bring better results for Islam (Shanahan 2005: 120).  
The second wave of political Islam in Lebanon began following the victory of the Iranian 
revolution and the formation of Lebanon Hezbollah. Political and social heteronomy of the 
Shiite Lebanon resulted in the formation of a powerful psychological structure that 
Hezbollah strongly supported. The aforesaid conditions (the heteronomy of the Shiites), the 
effects and the support for the Iran revolution, in addition to the miscalculation of the 
Lebanese governments and Israel created opportunity to establish social organization and 
movement. 
Lebanon Hezbollah, which was established under the conditions of a civil war, mixture of 
teachings from the Iranian revolution, selected a unique approach. There was an undeniable 
tendency toward radicalism in the political structure of Lebanon. However, as time passed 
and the conditions changed, the movement changed toward moderation. The transformation 
of Hezbollah towards moderation may be expressed within the analytical framework of the 
social movement theory. The completion of the Hezbollah is as a result of changes in the 
formation process, the political opportunity and resource mobilization.  
The formation and movement of Hezbollah toward moderation is divided into four 
periods as follows: 
 
National Political System of 
Lebanon 
Israel’s attack to Lebanon 
in the year 1982
Resource Mobilization 
Forming Process 
Ideology obtained from 
Islamic Revolution of Iran
Political Opportunity 
Material assists received  
from Iran  




1) The pre-birth stage including the initial mobilization of Shiites under the leadership of 
Imam Musa where the basis of the Hezbollah was facilitated through lack of accepting 
political rest and political mobilization inside the Lebanese political system 
2) Embryonic stage that was created through political and ideological opportunities 
offered on behalf of the Amal organization, the Lebanese civil war and the Iranian revolution 
3) The most challenging phase of Hezbollah’s development is its emergence during the 
attack of Israel in 1982 and the resources mobilized by the Iranian revolution 
4) The last stage is the merge of the principal political path of Lebanon that includes all 
three elements of social movements theory 
 
In sum, to explaining the political Islam as a general political structure of Lebanon, it is 
necessary to discuss the Formation Process with Islamic resistance, Political Opportunity as 
covering partnership in governmental institutions and Resource Mobilization as a mixture of 
assistance from Iran, domestic support and political organizational force. The completion of 
Hezbollah and the membership of Amal is completely compatible with modern social 
movement theory. According to the social movement theory, repeated oppositions and 
complains against developing competitive pressures has resulted in different groups and 
diverse patterns of movement. Divisions such as radical- moderate, conservative- liberal, 
old- young, ideological and activism within the movement show that the movement accepts 
diverse groups with different ideas (Wiktorowicz 2004: 17). This condition is exactly the 
same condition inside Amal. At the end of the Lebanese civil war, Amal lost its original 
dynamism and active support of movement that had been established by Imam Musa Al-Sadr. 
It turned into a system full of corruption, insufficiencies injustice which Amal was to fight 
against. The movement turned into severely political corrupt phenomena which needed to be 
reformed (Norton 2007: 23). This new reality was not taken well by all members. Being 
completely immersed in corruption, being accepted by government, and receiving benefits 
from Syria (Deeb 1998: 686), and carrying out unpopular activities among people are some 
of the reasons that have led to an increase in dissatisfaction of some Amal leaders. Therefore, 
it was time to establish a new branch inside Amal. However, until the Israeli attack, a 
political opportunity to assist this new movement was not created. 
 
 
7. ATTACK OF ISRAEL TO LEBANON & FORMATION OF LAST POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
 
According to the social movement theory, every movement will need its own particular 
necessities for initiation. It can be hence inferred that the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to 
drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces and the prolongation of Israeli 
army’s stay in Lebanon has been the main reason for the creation of Hezbollah. Among other 
effective reasons, the situation of Lebanon during the creation of Hezbollah can be 
mentioned. By the time of Israel’s invasion, Lebanon, which was engaged in civil war, was 
experiencing an abnormal political situation. After they were expelled from Jordan in 1970, 
the PLO active forces not only confronted Israel from inside Lebanon, but also challenged 
the Lebanese government. This situation not only turned the active political groups like 
Christian Lebanese Phalangists and Amal Shiite against the Palestinians, but also induced 
Israel to adopt short term strategies. These strategies consisted of responding to the attacks. 
On the long term, the strategy was to expel them from Lebanon based on invasion into that 
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country and violation of its territorial integrity.  It is worth mentioning that it was the above 
mentioned situation which created the strategic unity between Christian rightist Lebanese 
and Israelis in the process of the repression of PLO and their expulsion from Lebanon. Due 
to the leftist orientation of the PLO forces, its members allied with the Druze and the 
communist parties in Lebanon. They were led by the Phalangists of the Lebanese Kataeb 
party. The two mentioned sides would then deteriorate the situation by launching occasional 
attacks such as the assassination of Bachir Gemayel, the Lebanese president at the time, and 
incurring mass human casualties against each other, as they did in the case of the Sabra and 
Shatila massacre. During that time, the Lebanese Shiite community was lacking leadership 
after Imam Musa Al-Sadr’s disappearance. The collapse of the Shah regime and the 
subsequent formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran resulted in a favorable ground that 
created an ideological structure for the Shiite Islamism radicals in Lebanon. However, there 
is another point of view which posits a different story about the origins of the leadership of 
Hezbollah. Instead of the story that it was created based on inner group struggle in Amal 
(Norton 2007: 34), this alternative story argues that this opposition was created by Iran and 
Syria to challenge Amal and others in the mid 1980s. Iran revolution encouraged activism 
and helped form Shiite Islamism military groups (Haddad 2006: 24). Based on statements of 
Naim Qassem, the Deputy of Secretary General of Hezbollah, there was little time from the 
official announcement of the victory of the Iranian revolution and the appointment of Imam 
Khomeini as the leader of the Shiite population. The debate that took place within the Shiite 
clergy in Lebanon was serious. The Lebanese Shiites’ support for Iran was ethical in 1979 
and this was accompanied with attempts to have a working relationship with leadership of 
the Islamic revolution (Qassem 2005: 18). The initial center for the emergence of the Shiite 
Islamism activities in 1980 was a small group that accepted Hezbollah’s leadership in which 
they studied Islamic jurisprudence and theology in the city of Najaf in Iraq. Qassem has 
argued that if the city of Qom were the brain center of the Iranian revolution, then Najaf was 
another center where different thoughts were collected. It was also a city where all the future 
leaders of the Hezbollah were educated. Three outstanding characters of the Hezbollah 
including Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Raghib Harb and Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli (Norton 
2007: 34) were all educated here. They were all well qualified to be Hezbollah’s leaders. The 
effects of the Iranian revolution created a sense of urgency in the Lebanese Shiite radicals. 
This translated into the creation of the Hezbollah. Thus, the Hezbollah was greatly 
influenced by the Iranian revolution and the Islam movement. As Norton argues, when 
Hezbollah was created, tasks such as improving the society for the Lebanon Muslims were 
not among main priorities. Further, no one predicted that there would be an Israeli attack on 
the southern Lebanon. Even before the Israeli attack, the influence of the Iranian revolution 
still continued to be prevalent among the Shiites. Israeli occupation of Lebanon created a 
favorable condition for the growth and development of Hezbollah. On June 6, 1982, when 
Israel attacked Lebanon, two future leaders of Hezbollah, Harb and Tufayli were in Iran to 
attend the annual conference on Islam. Following the Israeli attack, Iran promptly announced 
its readiness to help the Lebanese people. The revolutionary corps of Iran immediately 
dispatched their troops to Ba‘albak at Biqa‘ valley (Jabar 1997: 47). The official declaration 
of Hezbollah, announcing its existence as a social and  political movement, took place three 
years after its establishment. In reality, Hezbollah was established on June 1982. Since the 
beginning of this institution in the Biqa‘ valley, the Iranian revolutionary corps was 
responsible for the resistance operation and the security of Hezbollah. Supports for Iran in 
addition to the Lebanese Shiites who devoted their life to the establishment and the 




formation of the Hezbollah led to this newly established institution to continue its hidden 
activity for more than two years in Ba‘albak region at east of Biqa‘ valley. Ba‘albak was not 
occupied by Israel. This allowed the revolutionary corps of Iran to stay in this region. 
Moreover, it was regarded as safe zone where the Hezbollah movements were free to carry 
out their activities. The proximity of Ba‘albak with Syria permitted members of the 
Hezbollah movement to freely travel to Iran. Since the beginning, the Hezbollah fighters 
acted within the framework of national resistance for Lebanon. They did not make any 
claims that sought to obtain credit for their new existence. This group took courageous 
attacks against Israeli soldiers (Jabar 1997: 51). Hezbollah, to resist against the Israeli 
occupation, began its activities including recruitment of new work forces with the material 
support from Iran. Hezbollah clergymen were in charge of publishing the ideology of Islamic 
revolution anywhere. This ranged from social centers to mosques, and to cemeteries. The 
structure of Hezbollah was mainly sustained by the Islam and the clergymen. Resistance 
against Israel certainly played role in it. This became a type of structure that was famous all 
throughout  Lebanon owing to the violence of the Shiites. 
 
 
8. DEVELOPING FOLLOWERS 
 
Although the Hezbollah initially had offensive aspect in relation to its ideology and 
military tactics, this condition did not result in a social success for this movement. This 
rather led to failure of this movement during the first three years. The most important lesson 
that Hezbollah learned during this period was how to attract and understand potential 
followers. Initially, the logic of Hezbollah was based on Islamic solution and slogan. They 
refused the East-West divide at the time which also referred to the ideological bifurcation of 
the time owing to the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They insisted on 
executing norms of Islamic behaviors in regions that were under their coverage. This was 
apparent in places like western Beirut and coastal cities in southern Lebanon. From 1983 
until 1986, parallel to its growing influence and tasks, this group also began to offer social 
services. This way, the Hezbollah established seventeen medical clinics and two hospitals in 
Lebanon (Hamzeh 1993: 329). Offering social services resulted in attracting the support of 
the people.  The popularity of Hezbollah began to overpower its former reputation that arose 
from its employment of violence in relation to norms of social behaviors. During that time 
the effects and the military presence of Hezbollah developed from Biqa‘ valley to suburbs of 
south of Beirut and south of Lebanon, so that in the end of 1983 it had developed into a 
considerable size, for a newly established force. During that time, only a few Lebanese 
understood real nature of this newly established force. However, from late 1983 and early 
1984, western Beirut changed into an Islamic region. The appearance of one of the most 
famous international capitals of world promptly changed. When they dominated the Shiites 
in western Beirut, the Hezbollah military men were observed in great numbers in the ruined 
streets. They wore green cloths over their head. On the cloths, Allah Akbar (God Is Great) 
was written. They also imposed limitation on women to wear Islamic veil and clothes. They 
planted dynamites in front of liquor stores located in Shiite regions to force them to close 
these shops. Some restaurants in the city which were not destroyed, held the title of family 
outside the restaurant windows. These impositions resulted in the creation of lifelessness in 
west Beirut. Since mid-1986, because of their radical activities, Hezbollah’s popularity 
among the public who required their support has declined. The Hezbollah forces in southern 
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Lebanon closed recreation centers including coffee shops. This had a negative effect for 
Hezbollah. For example, this prevented older people from enjoying their leisure time in 
coffee shops. Absolute Islamic rules and regulations in cities and villages imposed by the 
Hezbollah led to the emergence of radical interpretations in Islam. While the Hezbollah 
forces were happy to apply radical Islamic rules and regulations, the greater proportion of the 
Shiite population were dissatisfied. Imposition of such rules and regulations destroyed local 
economic institutions. Hezbollah-ruled area became secluded and became increasingly poor. 
Inhabitants of the southern villages immigrated to the northern shores around the cities of 
Sidon (Saida) and Beirut. Southern Lebanon changed into a war zone. This region seemed to 
be completely separated from other areas of Lebanon (Jabar 1997: 30). Timur Goksel, a 
senior political advisor of the UNIFIL who was a highly regarded Lebanese academic 
offered a short summary of the mistakes that the Hezbollah had made. Until 1986, Hezbollah 
was regarded as enemy. It showed aggressive behavior toward outsiders. Members of this 
movement were suspicious of other people. Thus, they worked behind closed doors. 
Communicating and talking with them was impossible task. Hezbollah during that time was 
a group of idealistic radical people. When Hezbollah forces attempted to dominate all aspects 
of people’s lives, they lost their support. Hezbollah forces also neglected an important point 
in cultural of Lebanon people, especially those living in southern Lebanon. Culture had a 
special importance to these people’s individuality and personality. In 1986, Hezbollah was 
separated into different groups. In the same year, Hezbollah forces applied radical Islamic 
approaches to behavior that were considered to be ultra vires. People’s support for this group 




9. MOVEMENT OF HEZBOLLAH TOWARD MODERATION: OPENING POLICY 
 
Two important events occurred in Lebanon in 1985. 
 
1) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the suburbs of Beirut to area south of Litany 
river (in southern Lebanon) 
2) Official declaration of Hezbollah as an Islamic resistance and movement organization  
 
In 1985, Hezbollah sent an open letter to the Daily Star Beirut, a newspaper, officially 
announcing its existence (Hamzeh 1993: 329). Hezbollah’s existence was argued to be 
legitimate since it became a force of powerful resistance which put the seemingly 
undefeatable Israeli forces under pressure. During that time, the unifying slogan of 
Hezbollah in relation to adhering to Islamic goals was much like an unwavering rock in 
which their most important goal was the jihad against Israel (Harik 2007: 55). The 
Hezbollah’s tendency to be closed towards the outside world and their analysis in relation to 
losing people’s support resulted in the reorganization of the movement in 1989. During that 
time Hezbollah went through a self-confidence crisis.  
Three events occurred that opened a political opportunity for the moderation of 
Hezbollah and consequent structural changes: 
First, the end of the Iran-Iraq war resulted in organized support of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran from the Hezbollah and its move towards a realistic path.  
Second, the Hezbollah leadership, which made the movement famous, turned into its 




weakness. The death of Imam Khomeini as the political-spiritual leader of the Lebanese 
Islamic movement resulted in disagreements and inner struggles within the movement. This 
was manifested when Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, the radical leader of Hezbollah was 
dismissed from the movement’s leadership.  
Third, the Lebanese civil war ended in 1989. 
The aforesaid factors induced group members to make changes to the principal structures. 
Efforts to reform the Hezbollah resulted in a separation of this movement from radical 
politics and organizational decision making. Finding an ideological balance led to two new 
opportunities for the Hezbollah. The most important among them was the Hezbollah’s 
decision to take part in the elections. This was possible when the classic concept of jihad was 
redefined by extending its spiritual meaning to partnership in elections (Harik 2007: 58). 
Another result of the ideological change was the transformation of the military forces of the 
Hezbollah into an effective and small force with a completely separate political and social 
existence. Organizational separation of the military forces and the civil approach of 
Hezbollah prepared political atmosphere for entering this movement to principal political 
process of Lebanon. Its move from a secret organization into a transparent movement was 
not temporary started since the late 1980s and continues to this day. Upon end of the 
Lebanese civil war and signing of the Ta’if Accord, a new political opportunity opened for 
the Hezbollah. The 1989 Ta’if Accord, famous for the National Reconcile Agreement, 
offered a plan to end the civil war through national reconciliation and reform of the political 
system with more attention to the fair distribution of political power. The key factor was the 
dissolution of different military groups which were under the supervision of Syria, except 
one group. In order to retain its military branch, the Hezbollah changed its name from a 
military group to a resistance movement that was authorized to use weapon. The unique 
status of military branch of Hezbollah in Lebanon was a result of the implicit agreement 
between Iran and Syria (Ranstorp 1997: 51). Stabilizing the status of Hezbollah and allowing 
it to keep its military group as Islamic resistance group (not just a military group) received 
huge support from the Lebanese people. During that time, parts of Lebanon occupied by 
Israel was regarded as impediment for improving Lebanon. When the role of the Hezbollah 
as a resistance organization was redefined, this group was able to become a candidate for 
parliament elections in 1992. Partnership in the 1992 elections became a testing ground for 
the revolutionary view point of the Hezbollah. Following Hezbollah’s decision to attend the 
elections, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was appointed as Secretary General of Hezbollah in April 
1992. Nasrallah was the opposite of Subhi al-Tufayli, the ex-radical leader of Hezbollah. 
Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli was one of the founders of Hezbollah and its first secretary general. 
During his leadership, Hezbollah showed extremist tendency including the establishment of 
an Islamic government in Lebanon. By May 1991, Hezbollah was seeking partnership in the 
Lebanese politics and so they had him replaced with Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi. As one of the 
closest friends of al-Tufayli, al-Musawi had his own ideas and methods. He tried to refrain 
from resorting to violence in handling domestic affairs and wished to settle problems in a 
peaceful manner. This was against the methods of al-Tufayli who confronted the domestic 
and foreign issues in the same manner. Al-Musawi’s changes in methods were in fact a 
reflection of the changes in the visions of Hezbollah. The Hezbollah wished to comply with 
the realities of Lebanon after the dissolution of militant groups under the Ta’if Accord. Al-
Musawi was killed in February 1992 attack of the Israeli helicopters with his child and wife. 
Thus, his leadership lasted less than a year. Nassrollah would follow his path, only with more 
power. During his reign, Hezbollah attracted social support as a result of its strategy. Its 
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strategy was an open policy (Harik 2007: 77). The result of this strategy was the attainment 
of 12 seats out of 128 seats in the parliament in the 1992 election. Political strategy of 
Hezbollah was effective. In spite of initial failures in attracting public popularity, Hezbollah 
successfully established its legitimacy as resistance force and civil representative of people 
in 19802. Now, a great number of the Lebanon people are convinced that Hezbollah does not 
intend to eliminate and replace political system of Lebanon. They believe that it is attempting 
to join it. In the past, Hezbollah was considered a threat to Lebanon. As this group 
cooperated with the Christians, this fear was dramatically reduced. Such activities convinced 
many Lebanon people that the military branch of the Hezbollah was merely fighting against 





The decision of the Hezbollah to participate in the elections was as a result of vast 
changes of the principal laws of this movement. From 1985 to 1992 Hezbollah changed its 
radical Islamic ideology into a moderate one. This moderation was dramatically manifested 
when it participated the 1992 elections. Events that took place after 1992 including the 
unilateral exit of Israel from southern Lebanon in 2000, the war with Israel in 2006, the civil 
struggle in 2008 to secure an independent Hezbollah telephone line and other issues related 
to the central government, and the newly established image of activism (or moderation) 
improved Hezbollah’s reputation as an organization that has integrity in the Lebanese 
political system. Opponents of Hezabollah’s new moderate policy resorted to engaging in a 
war-like resistance action against government in 2008, when the government tried to 
eliminate Hezbollah’s communication network. The opponents were concerned about the 
intention of the Hezbollah in relation to the activities that came with its partnership as the 
principal path of Lebanon’s policy. Hezbollah proved itself to be an important component of 
the Lebanese political structure in the summer of 2000 by disclosing that it retained a 
resistance force.  
Following the exit of Israel from Lebanon, a series of serious discussions were held 
inside Hezbollah about issues including corruption, whether Hezbollah intended to focus on 
Lebanese policies of Lebanon and whether or not to maintain the current status of resistance 
at the national level (Lebanon) and the regional level (Middle East). Finally, Hezbollah 
proved this issue through its resistance in its war against Israel in the summer of 2006. 
Therefore as social movement theory predicts, the voting ballot is a death sentence for 
radicalism (Baylouny 2004: 2). Data indicate that when opportunity of partnership in 
political field is granted to movements whereby they have a choice to select a moderate 
policy, they will dramatically change their orientation and respond to this motive. The 
experience of Hezbollah proves this dynamism in the Lebanese domestic policy. 
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2 The Hezbollah’s popularity was mentioned in order to show the change of public opinion about this 
group regarding the changes in its approach in the two different time periods of early and late 1980s. 
A proof to this claim was the result of 12 seats out of a total of 128 Lebanese parliamentary seats in 
the 1992 elections.  
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